

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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S-E-C-R-E-T

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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION.

report

on the military units of the Rumanian Ministry of the Interior (MAI). Although much of the information is dated 1956, the reports provides a good study on the various types of military units, duties, organization and training of the MAI troops.

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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY : Rumania

SUBJECT : Military Units of the Ministry of Interior (MAI)

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General Information

1. The Rumanian Ministry of Interior (MAI) has a troops directorate (directia trupelor M.A.I.), which is responsible for its military units. These units are divided into categories of Frontier Guards (Graniceri), which were transferred to the Ministry of Armed Forces (^{MFA}~~FMA~~) in 1961; shock troops (trupe de interventie); training units (unitati de instructie); and guard troops (trupe de paza). All of the units coordinate closely with other directorates of the Ministry of Interior, which consist of the State Security Directorate (Directia Securitatii Statului), the Militia Directorate (Directia Militiei), the Prisons Directorate (Directia Penitenciarelor), and the Fire Prevention Directorate (Directia Paza Contra Incendii), which was to be disbanded in

- 2 -

1961 and its subordinate units transferred to the local authorities.

2. Prior to 1952 the two types of guard units in existence were the lines of communication guard units (brigada paza comunicatiilor) and the plant and institution guard units (brigada paza institutiilor si intreprinderi). They were merged in 1952 under one guard unit headquarters, and subsequently various unsuccessful attempts were made to establish a joint command for the Guard and shock troop units in a single framework called "Security Troops" (Trupe de Securitate). These units had many things in common, such as the same basic infantry training, the same arms and manpower establishments, and, after the merger of the guards units, identical uniforms with the same shoulder boards and blue collars; it is virtually impossible to distinguish between them. Owing to the special nature of functions of the two types of units, guarding and armed intervention, and because training units have ceased to function as independent bodies, only the guard and shock troop units have remained in the Military Units Directorate.
3. The guard units of the Ministry of Interior are responsible for physical protection of the different ministries, important ministerial installations, telecommunications installations,

- 3 -

50X1-HUM

institutions and factories of national importance, railroads, bridges, and traffic junctions.

Guard Units

- 4. The national headquarters of the guard units, [] is** 50X1-HUM
- located in a former Frontier Guards barracks, on the corner of Fagaras and General Anghelescu Streets, Bucharest, opposite the military hospital. In 1956 the following six regiments were subordinate to this headquarters:**
- a. 1st Regiment, in Bucharest, which prior to 1956 was stationed at the 10th kilometer on the road to Ploesti but was subsequently transferred to Buzau. Before 1956, and until about 1957, [] When** 50X1-HUM
 - the headquarters of the regiment was transferred from the 10th kilometer, its barracks was taken over by the Military Units Directorate.**
 - b. 2nd Regiment, in Ploesti.**
 - c. 3rd Regiment, in Iasi.**
 - d. 4th Regiment, in Cluj. The headquarters of this regiment occupied a building near Cluj railway station, which was originally constructed for a railway guards unit.**
 - e. 5th Regiment, in Timisoara. The regiment headquarters** 50X1-HUM
 - was located at 1 Splaiul Nicolae Titulescu []**

- 4 -

f. 6th Regiment, Craiova.

The fact that guard units stationed at Virful Costila, Sinaia, and Miercurea Ciuc were not subordinate to any of the regiments lends weight to the assumption that an additional regiment (number not known) was stationed at Brasov. (There is also a possibility that the Regiment Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 6 have been confused, but Regiments 1 and 5 were definitely stationed at Bucharest and Timisoara, respectively.)

5. The organizational structure of the guard regiments was by no means permanent, and there were frequent exchanges of personnel among them. As a rule, each regiment had three or four battalions, with about three or four companies in each battalion and three to five platoons in each company. Smaller units within the platoons ranged from six to 20 men, depending on the size of the objective to be guarded.

6. The following were subordinate units of the 1st Regiment in Bucharest:

- a. Battalion 1, Paza, which was stationed near Podul Grant on Soseaua Giulesti, Bucharest, and was responsible for guarding the 23 August and Republica Factories, the IFA Nuclear Physics Institute, and ~~general~~ bridges in the same area.

- 5 -

- b. **Batalion Special, which was stationed at the same barracks as Batalion 1 and was responsible for guarding the various ministries and ministerial installations.**
 - c. **One or two battalions, which were stationed at Cernavoda and in the vicinity of Constanta.**
7. **The following were subordinate units of Batalion 1, Paza, Bucharest:**
- a. **Battalion headquarters, which was located in the vicinity of Podul Grant.**
 - b. **Compania "23 August," which was stationed in the courtyard of the factory of the same name. One platoon of this company was responsible for guarding the Republica factory.**
 - c. **Compania Gara Filaret, which was stationed north of the Filaret railway station until 1956; since then it has been stationed on the road to Oltenita, in a building which previously housed a Securitate training depot (apparently for espionage in Western countries, foreign language and other courses being held there). The premises vacated by the company north of the Filaret railway station were subsequently occupied by the headquarters of a Minister of Interior field security unit. The company was responsible for guarding the Securitate installations on Uranus Street and a bridge over the Arges River.**

- 6 -

(near Comana), while one platoon guarded the nuclear reactor at Comuna Magurele.

- d. Compania Jilava, which had about 160 men and was divided into four platoons, was responsible for guarding the Jilava Prison and its outer fences.

8. The following were subordinate units of the 5th Regiment in Timisoara:

- a. Batalion 1, Paza, whose headquarters occupied a building which had been constructed for the town railway guards units, on the same street as Hotel No. 3.
- b. Batalion 2, Paza, whose headquarters was located on the main street of Resita, in the vicinity of the town railway station.
- c. Batalion 3, Paza, whose headquarters was located in Petrosani, on the west side of the road to Livezeni and near the southernmost building in town.
- d. Compania Speciala, which was directly subordinate to the regimental headquarters.

When the regiment was organized in 1952, it had the total strength of a battalion only. Subsequently, it was increased, and each company has about 300 to 400 men.

9. The following were subordinate units of Batalion 1, Paza, Timisoara:

- 7 -

- a. **Battalion headquarters .**
- b. **Compania 1, whose headquarters was located in the Railway Directorate building at the end of the trolleybus route in Timisoara and which had the following platoons:**
 - (1) **Disciplinary platoon (Pluton Disciplinar), stationed at Recas.**
 - (2) **Town platoon, responsible for guarding the post office and telephone exchange building, the regional broadcasting studios, and the local ALA headquarters building.**
 - (3) **R-1 platoon, responsible for guarding the new broadcasting station on Calea Aradului, Timisoara.**
 - (4) **Bridge platoon, responsible for guarding bridges over the Topolovat, Chizatau, and Belin Rivers.**
 - (5) **Timiseni platoon, responsible for guarding bridges and tunnels near Jebel, Padureni, Voiteni, and Gataia.**
 - (6) **R-5 platoon, responsible for guarding the radio jamming station at Padurea Verde.**
- c. **Compania 2, whose headquarters was located at Caransebes, had the following platoons:**
 - (1) **Otelul Rosu platoon, responsible for guarding the metallurgical works and the Marul hydroelectric power station.**

- 8 -

- (2) Caransebes platoon, responsible for guarding a number of institutions in town and a few bridges on the railway line between Resita and Caransebes.
- (3) Muntele Mic platoon, responsible for guarding the radio relay station and adjacent goniometer installations. A small auxiliary unit of this platoon was stationed at a Trupe de Securitate barracks in Birlova and was responsible for conveying supplies to the platoon stationed on the mountain.
- (4) Bridge and tunnel platoon, responsible for guarding the Fenes-Armenis tunnel, the Poarta tunnel, the Domosnea - Cornea tunnel, a bridge near Teregoval, and a bridge on the Toplet.
- d. Compania 3, whose headquarters was located in Arad, operated only at certain times; it is doubtful that it still exists. The company had the following platoons:
- (1) Arad platoon, responsible for guarding the large underground air raid shelter of the ALA headquarters, the road bridge and highway to Aradul Nou, and the railway bridge to Aradul Nou.
- (2) Birzava platoon, responsible for guarding a large underground MAI ammunition store at coordinates ES 760055, Map of Rumania 1:100,000.

- 9 -

(3) Lipova platoon, responsible for guarding a number
of bridges. 50X1-HUM

(4) Chisinau-Cris platoon, responsible for guarding
bridges near Sintana, Zerind, Nadau, Tamajda,
Udrinis, and Chistinau-Cris.

10. The following were subordinate units of Batalion 2, Paza, Resita:
- a. Battalion headquarters, located on the main street of Resita.
 - b. Compania Resita, which had three platoons responsible for guarding the gates and perimeter fence of the Resita Works, the mine and kiln at Secul, the lime kiln at Calnic, and the mine at Domani. An additional platoon of this company was responsible for guarding the power station at Crainicel and the Valiuc and Breazova dams and also patrolled the aqueduct to the power station.
 - c. Compania Bocsa, whose subordinate platoons were responsible for guarding the tool factory at Bocsa Montana, the bridge near Bocas Romina, and several lime kilns and additional bridges.
 - d. Compania Oravita, whose subordinate platoons were responsible for guarding the tunnels, bridges, and aqueducts between Anina and Oravita, the explosives store at Steirdorf, near Anaina, and several coal mines in the Anina area.

- 10 -

11. The following were subordinate units of Batalion 3 Paza,

Petrosani:

- a. Battalion headquarters, at the same location as Batalion 3, Paza.
- b. Compania Valea Sadului, which was responsible for guarding the local munitions factory.
- c. Compania Petrosani, whose platoons were responsible for guarding bridges and tunnels on the Bumbesti - Lévezeni line (Iscrani, Pietrele Albe, Meri, Lupeni, Vulcan). One platoon of this company was permanently stationed at Lévezeni.
- d. Compania Hunedoara, whose platoons were responsible for guarding the gates and perimeter fence of the local metallurgical works and the mines at Teliuc and Ghelar.
- e. Compania Orastie, which had the following platoons:
 - (1) Gugir, responsible for guarding the ordnance factory.
 - (2) Calan, responsible for guarding the metallurgical works.
 - (3) Simeria, responsible for guarding the local railway junction.
 - (4) Tanantul, responsible for guarding the chemical works.
 - (5) Nadrag, responsible for guarding the metallurgical works.

12. The following were subordinate units of the Special Company, which was directly subordinate to the 5th Regiment headquarters in Timisoara:

- 11 -

- a. Company headquarters, which was located in Brad.
- b. Brand platoon, which was responsible for guarding the bridge near Carmagiul and the tunnel just outside Brand.
- c. Barza platoon, which was responsible for guarding the gold ore washing plant at Gura Barza, the open-cast mine at Barza, and the mine at Musarini.
- d. Luncoi platoon, which was responsible for guarding a railway track which was laid but never used as it is not connected to any main line. (This story was repeated in all the units.)

Additional platoons stationed at one time at Zlatna, Abrud, and Rosia Montana have been disbanded. The training depot of the Ministry of Interior guard units, which was located at Brad, was subordinate to the 5th Regiment at Timisoara and was administratively attached to headquarters of the Special Company.

Other Units of the Ministry of Interior.

13. Other military units subordinate to the Ministry of Interior were the following:
- a. A shock troops battalion (batalion interventie) and a shock troops training depot, stationed in Orastie.
 - b. A shock troops battalion and training depot, located at Floresti, near Cluj.

- 12 -

50X1-HUM

- c. A shock troops battalion, stationed at Resita.
- d. A shock troops battalion, at Timisoara.
- e. A shock troops battalion and a special ski training depot, stationed at Birlova, near Caransebes.
- f. A shock troops regiment ("RSB"), stationed in Bucharest.
- g. A shock troops and guard training depot, located at Odorhei (formerly used to train railway guards).
- h. Two guard battalions, one subordinate to the 1st Regiment in Bucharest and the other to the 6th Regiment in Craiova, and a guard units training depot, all located in Turnu Magurele.
- i. A guard unit training depot, which formerly trained Frontier Guards, located at Satu Mare.
- j. A guard unit training depot, which was previously used for training shock troops, located at Marghita.
- k. A shock troops battalion and training depot, located at Vanatori in the Sighisoara district. Occasionally this depot holds courses for officers and enlisted men of Ministry of Interior units.
- l. A shock troops and guard units training depots, which at one period served as a school for officers of these units, located at Radna.

- 13 -

- m. An officers training depot, which holds refresher courses (Reinstruire) for MAI officers who are considered to lack discipline and competence, located at Botosani.
- n. A MAI combat officers' school (Scoala De Ofiteri De Front - MAI), located on Rulikovski Street, Oradea. For a few years this school held joint two-year courses for guard unit, shock troops, and Frontier Guards officers; recently, separate course have been held for each service branch.
- o. Political Officers' school No. 2 (Scoala No. 2 De Ofiteri Politici), also located in Oradea. In 1950 and 1951 the school held three courses for political officers of MAI units; since then it has served as ^AMAI academy and has held short (six months to one year) courses for senior officers.

Recruits Selection Procedures for MAI Units

- 14. A representative of the Ministry of Interior sits on every regional recruiting committee and, in accordance with a high-level agreement, has first choice in the selection of suitable candidates for MAI units. The actual selection is preceded by a study of the recruits' files, thereby eliminating the majority at the outset. Although information in a recruit's personnel file may prevent his acceptance for MAI service, if he is selected, his file is retained

- 14 -

to be used for repeated security checks. Many new conscripts are transferred from training depots and from assigned units to labor battalions, because of conflicting information in their personnel files and their files at the recruiting offices.

15. Following are the basic requirements for recruitment into MAI units:

- a. Proletarian origin; less preferable but still acceptable are peasant and middle-class backgrounds, provided the latter do not come from propertied families and are not members of professions.
- b. Party or UTM membership.
- c. Combat fitness. The strictest possible selection is applied to this requirement, and in the units the number of men suffering from chronic illnesses not diagnosed at the recruiting centers is very small. They are all given administrative or services duties; if none of these jobs is available their illnesses are ignored and the men remain in their operational units. This is done to avoid the creation of an over-large proportion of non-combatants in the units.

16. Little importance is attached to the intelligence and psychic make-up of MAI recruits, and therefore they do not undergo

- 15 -

any intelligence or psycho-technic tests. It is assumed that the MAI prefers to recruit persons of limited intelligence, who may easily be molded to fit its requirements. However, no rules exist with regard to this matter.

17. It would be dangerous for a prospective recruit to declare an express wish to join the MAI units, as he would be automatically suspected of subversive intentions. On the other hand, any good athlete, fulfilling the necessary requirements, may express his desire to continue sports activities, with excellent chances of being recruited by the MAI.
18. It is possible for a conscript in a MAI unit, who wishes to be transferred to another service branch, to obtain his transfer without harming his own interests, by gradually mentioning "negative details" of his past, such as having relatives abroad, or the fact that his grandfather was a property owner. As a rule, transfers from MAI units are to labor battalions.

Training of Personnel for MAI Units

19. After about 10 days of attestation processing, the recruits are gradually introduced to a training discipline, which is intensified as time passes. The purpose of this training is not to break the recruit and mold him according to the wishes of his superiors, but to mold him gradually. Simultaneously with this training,

- 16 -

the recruit undergoes numerous hours of indoctrination, either in simple lecture form or combined with operations and training exercises. Particular attention is paid to the development of "unit spirit" through organization of group activities such as joint rest periods, community singing, and walks after meals. The discipline is very severe, and a strict time-table is adhered to; eventually the unit is prepared to accept any orders blindly and carry them out with the utmost precision.

20. The recruits' basic military training consists of individual, section, and platoon field training (attack and defense only), in addition to special training (Instructie specifica de arma), such as ambushing, screening, blocking, widespread searches, the defense of civilian objectives, mountain warfare, and street fighting. Their weapon training is with the ZB rifle, ZB light machine gun and PPSH and Orita submachine guns.
21. The recruits' political indoctrination, which is carried out by means of section agitators, includes a daily morning lecture (the day's news with an official interpretation) and an additional two-hour class daily, mainly in the afternoon. As many MAI recruits are illiterate, basic education courses are organized at both the training depots and operational units; they are all taught to read and write and also receive some general elementary

- 17 -

education. At the end of their basic training, entire classes of illiterates are transferred to guard units to make it easier for them to continue their studies several times weekly. Every few months they take examinations under the supervision of the Ministry of Education. As a result of this system, even the most backward soldier is able to read and write upon completion of his MAI service and is regarded as having completed four classes of elementary school. A number of soldiers with secondary school educations are also posted to these units, to prevent the general standard from falling to a too-low level.

22. After a six-month period of basic training, the recruits are assigned units, where they undergo advanced training. Candidates for NCO schools (scoala de sergenti) are chosen from among the recruits at basic training centers and are sent to the schools before being posted to their units.

23. The type of advanced training given in the units depends upon the unit's operational function. Guard units are trained in attacking and defending certain objectives, while shock troops units carry out numerous practice alerts, mountain warfare training, and other duties.

24. The daily routine in the guard units is as follows:

a. 8 hours' guard duty (two four-hour shifts; the soldier

- 18 -

may not be given additional guard duty).

- b. Two hours' training.
- c. Two hours' political indoctrination.
- d. 8 hours' sleep (compulsory).

The remainder of the day is divided between cultural activities and various fatigue duties.

25. The regimental NCO schools train commanders for guard units and NCO's for shock troop units. The schools actually repeat the basic training program, with stress on fine performance, in addition to planning war games and their subsequent analysis, the development of leadership among the students, and their preparation to serve as instructors in units.

26. The training of officers for MAI units falls into the following two categories:

- a. The training of political officers in courses of varying lengths, depending upon current needs. (Should there be a demand for political officers, a course is started with several hundred participants, is completed within a few months, and its graduates posted to the units. If time allows, the courses are extended for a few additional months until the students are required by their units.)

Therefore, the standard of political officers in MAI

- 19 -

units is far from uniform.

- b. The training of operational officers in continuous two-year courses of intense training.

27. An additional difference between political and operational officers lies in the following recruitment methods:

- a. Operational officers are recruited by radio and press announcements (requirements are a minimum secondary school education and a high medical rating). The authorities select those who are "politically reliable" from among the applicants.
- b. Political officers are recruited at the MAI training depots, from among educated recruits and/or (sic) those of definite proletarian origin.

28. MAI political officers' courses range from three to six months in length, during which time a considerable number of students are dropped. Of the 1,400 students who started a political officers' course in Oradea in 1951, the majority of whom were illiterate peasants, only 900 became officers, and of these only about 200 were still serving in 1958. In recent years, candidates for these courses have been required to have secondary school educations. Officers with the rank of captain and above have been told that they must either complete high school or resign

- 20 -

from the service. As a result, numerous officers are completing their education as independent high school students. An additional means of improving the standard of political officers, which was recently introduced, is an examination for promotion. Even those who are recommended for promotion must take this examination. A minimum period of service is required before promotion is considered.

29. The rather limited curriculum of the political officers' course includes history of the Rumanian and Soviet Communist Parties and political economy. After the course, these subjects are continuously revised at seminars for political officers, which are held in their units; twice a month three-day political seminars are held for officers and NCO's, organized at the following levels:
 - a. Company seminars are organized for platoon commanders and their seconds-in-command.
 - b. Battalion seminars are organized for company commanders.
 - c. Regimental seminars for battalion commanders.
30. The material studied at the seminars is subsequently taught at the lowest levels (insofar as these men are capable of understanding), and political and general military knowledge tests are given every autumn for all unit personnel. These are

- 21 -

judged by senior officers from the MAI units headquarters, who credit or debit the results of the officers and NCO's. As the personal advancement of the latter depends largely on the success of their subordinates in these tests, the NCO's devote most of their energies during the two or three months preceding the tests to the preparation of their men, at the cost of their routine duties.

31. Field security officers (ofiteri de contra - informatie) are recruited for MAI units from MAI political officers' courses, graduates of MAI basic-training depots, and civilian personnel of the Securitate. The field security officers are chosen for their toughness, "alertness" to subversion by their comrades, and willingness to inform on any of their friends. Candidates undergo a six-month course before assignment to their units. An additional one-year course is held for the advanced training of experienced field security officers (both courses are held under the auspices of the Securitate).

Conditions of Service in MAI Units

32. The training programs and standing orders of the MAI units are identical with those of the Ministry of Armed Forces (MFA). Owing to the special nature of operations in which they participate, MAI unit personnel are entitled to a 12 per cent increment

- 22 -

above the pay of an MFA soldier. Prior to 1952, MAI officers also benefited from this increment, but since then it has been awarded to enlisted men only. In 1956 it was decided to reinstate the 10 per cent differential to MAI officers. Although considered too small an increase, it could not be enlarged without upsetting the equal status between officers of the various armed services. Subsequently, the MAI decided to raise the strength of its units and to link pay rates to appointments, thereby increasing the officers' pay indirectly. In addition, platoon commanders in MAI guard units receive a special increment for their job responsibility. As a result, the platoon commander's pay is about 150 to 200 lei per month higher than that of his immediate superior, the company commander, who does not have any direct responsibility for the installations.

33. Ostensibly, no discrimination exists between combat units (including those of the MAI) with regard to clothing and rations. However, MAI shock troop units are issued extra rations for the additional effort involved in their frequent movements, and certain MAI guard units are issued extra rations to compensate for hardship posts (such as mountain tops). Numerous units, both guard and shock troops, breed their own pigs; the fat is stocked in general rations stores and the meat is divided among

- 23 -

the men, who may eat it at will. The officers in MAI units organize "kitchen funds" to which they donate monthly payments to purchase condiments and additional food, which is cooked separate from the men's rations. On the whole, the food in MAI units is very good, and in the officers' messes for shock troop units it is excellent. The food served in the officers' messes provides 4,700 calories per day per man.

34. Special shops existed for member of security units and their families until 1956, when they were finally closed down. It was advantageous to use these shops because their prices were lower and they were stocked with far greater variety of goods than ordinary shops.
35. Before 1956, MAI officers were allowed large rations of firewood (a very rare commodity in Rumania) free of charge from the MAI stores. Since 1956 they have been allowed an additional ration (equivalent to that allowed all government employees), for which they pay only half price.
36. MAI enlisted men are forbidden to marry during their period of service. Officers must request permission to marry, giving full particulars of their future wives. On the basis of these particulars, the woman and her family are carefully screened and, if there is any doubt of reliability, permission is refused.

- 24 -

It is absolutely forbidden to marry without permission. The officers submit numerous appeals against refusals and in many cases are finally granted permission. Should any woman appeal to the commanding officer of a MAI unit, claiming that one of his subordinate officers had been intimate with her and refused to marry, the commanding officer must order the woman to be screened; if she is found to be reliable security-wise, the officer is compelled to marry her. This rule has often been employed by a certain type of woman of "good" proletarian origin as a means of acquiring a husband.

37. Since 1 May 1956, MAI regulations governing leave have been relaxed. Prior to that date the units were in a permanent state of alert, with no ordinary leave granted to any ranks up to regimental commander. (The men always slept fully dressed with their weapons close at hand.) After-duty leave has since been granted to battalion commanders and above, even to junior officers, although not as frequently as to their superiors. Guard unit personnel are given 24 hours' rest leave per week, which may be spent at a neighboring town. However, this leave is never granted on Sundays or holidays because on these days guard detachments are reinforced to prevent sabotage, and numerous opportunities arise for drunken brawls between servicemen

- 25 -

and civilians.

Political Organization of the MAI Units

38. The political organization of MAI units before 1951 was as follows:

- a. The second-in-command (political) to the commanding officers of the MAI units (Commandantul De Arma) headed the General Political Directorate (Directia Generala Politica) of the service.
- b. The General Political Directorate had the following sub-directorates: agitprop directorate (Directia Propaganda si Agitatie), political cadres directorate (Directia Cadre Politice), unit Party cell organization directorate, and unit UTM cell organization directorate. The General Political Directorate was headed by Draghici (fnu) and later by Burca (fnu), high-ranking personalities who gave the directorate the status of a department at the Party CC. The UTM cells organization directorate was headed by a member of the UTM CC.

39. Since 1951 the General Political Directorate has been reduced to the status of a department (serviciul politic), with its importance ^{sign} the Ministry of Interior accordingly decreased. The sub-directorates have become sections (sectii instead

- 26 -

of ~~Directii~~) and their sections have become offices (~~Birouri~~). Except for changes in their status, no alterations have been made in the functions of the departments or offices.

40. Following are details of the "offices" of the Agitprop Section (Sectia Propaganda Si Agitatie) and their activities since 1951:

- a. Cadres Education Office (Biroul Educatie Cadre), which draws up curricula for courses, seminars, and lectures in Marxism-Leninism for officers and NCO's and also teaches this subject.
- b. Troops Education Office (Biroul Educatie Trupa), which plans and executes mass political indoctrination courses (daily and periodical lectures).
- c. Culture and Sport Office (Biroul Cultural Si Sportiv), which is responsible for cultural clubs in the units and the organization of lectures on general subjects, film shows, circles for lovers of Russian literature (Arlus), and basic education courses.
- d. The Agitprop office (Biroul Agitatie), which appoints agitators at all levels who persuade and encourage the unit personnel to volunteer for extra work and duties. The agitators (agitatori) are an important factor in the unit organization because of the "assistance" they give to the commanding officer. They detect disciplinary

- 27 -

offenders, initiate additional "volunteer" work, encourage the men to forego their pay on behalf of Korean war invalids, etc.

- e. The Press Office (Biroul Presa), which edits and circulates the newspapers, In Slujba Patriei, published twice weekly, and the monthly Pentru Patrie. The circulation of these papers is limited to MAI units only, one copy printed for each man. Their contents are banal and boring. In reporting news from the units, they mention personalities but not unit numbers or locations. The office also organizes editorial committees for unit bulletins.

41. The Political Cadres Section (Sectia Cadre Politice), so called since 1952, is responsible for all political officers in MAI units and has ⁴senior cadres office (Biroul Cadre Superiore), ⁶junior cadres office (biroul cadre inferioare), and ²troops office (biroul trupa).
42. Both the Party and UTM cell organization sections have registration and membership fees office (Biroul Evidenta si Contizatii) and a control office (biroul control).
43. All operational MAI units at battalion level and in training depots have a second-in-command officer (political), to whom the following are subordinate:

- 28 -

- a. Cultural instructor (instructor cultural).
 - b. Agitprop instructor (instructor propaganda si agitatie).
 - c. Cadres instructor (instructor de cadre).
 - d. Party organization instructor (instructor de partid).
 - e. UTM organization instructor (instructor de UTM).
 - f. Company political deputy commanders, to whom platoon political deputy commanders are subordinate.
 - g. Section agitators, who are responsible for routine work at the lowest level.
44. In late 1952 the political organization of MAI units was subjected to a new wave of changes. Its T/O was considerably reduced, and the appointment of a second-in-command (political) to the commanding officer of MAI units was abolished. A new appointment was created at regimental level in the form of a chief agitprop officer (ofiter de agitatie), responsible for preparing lectures and indoctrination material for circulation among the ranks. This appointment, however, has only served to swell the existing T/O because the work of the chief agitator is still being done by various other bodies.
45. In 1953, when Stelian Staicu was appointed to head the MAI forces, the following new directives were issued:
- a. The authority of the commanding officer of the MAI units

- 29 -

is supreme and his decisions are final, overriding any objection by the second-in-command (political).

- b. The political deputy commanders of MAI units have no authority to intervene in administrative and operational matters, although they may offer alternate suggestions.

These directives, together with marginal comments, were published in a special secret manual. It had been necessary to abolish the highly abnormal and insufferable situation, whereby a young, inexperienced political deputy commander could give orders behind the back of the unit commanding officer who was often an experienced professional soldier.

Field Security in the MAI Units

46. The MAI units at battalion level and above had a field security officer (ofiter contra-informatie or more popularly called tovaras contra). At regimental level the MAI units had field security sections in addition to officers in the battalions.
47. The conditions of service of the field security officers (recruitment and training described in para. 31, above) are better than those of other officers, including politicals. They have their own chain of command and are not subordinate to their commanding officers (no sensible regimental commander would dare become involved in a dispute with the field security

- 30 -

officer in one of his subordinate battalions). The field security officers enjoy greater freedom than their colleagues, receive more leave, and receive additional pay in a separate, sealed envelope, often 75 per cent, but never less than 30 per cent, of their "first wage". The term "first wage" relates to appointment pay plus increments.

48. A typical incident, demonstrating the attitude of field security officers and their conditions of service, occurred at a gathering of officers of the Timisoara Guard Regiment in 1956. The gathering was convened to explain to the officers a high-level decision to cut their pay by several hundred lei. The meeting was arranged in a normal way, to bring about a "decision from below" in which the officers would voice a demand for an "economy drive" in the armed services, including reductions in their own salaries. The opening speech stressed the country's need for development and possible economy measures. The regimental field security officer also preached austerity, demanding that his own pay be reduced by several hundred lei. He was followed by other "volunteers" who spoke of the necessity for pay reductions, and finally the appropriate "decision" was accepted. By chance, a number of officers present at the gathering had seen the regiment's pay sheets

- 31 -

the previous day, and had noticed that the sum of their "decision" had already been deducted from their pay. They also discovered that the sum ostensibly deducted from the pay of the security officers was returned to them in sealed envelopes, according to a separate pay sheet. The officers refused to remain silent and brought it to the attention of the gathering. As a result, they were all either dismissed from the service or transferred to other units.

49. The work of a field security officer is based on the following:
- a. Written reports, submitted by Party and UTM members to their superiors, on their impressions of any event, person, or thing. Political activists are morally obliged to write such reports, and although many attempt to evade this obligation, a huge amount of information eventually reaches the field security officer. Among this material are details of the behavior of a certain soldier during a political lecture, of ~~the~~ ^a man who asked his superior questions during training and the answers he was given, of ~~a~~ ^a man who refused to enter into a political discussion, of participants in "social gatherings" such as songfests, dances, and outings. The field security officer meets regularly with secretaries of the Party and UTM cells to

- 32 -

discuss the material, the former noting the data of special interest to him.

- b. The extensive informer network run by every field security officer in his unit. Informers are recruited by the field security officer on the basis of a study of personnel files of all unit personnel, the first choices obviously being those of either working class or peasant origin who are Party or UTM members. One informer is normally recruited for each section (seven or eight men), but if the section or group of men is larger than average, additional informers are recruited accordingly. The informers are employed in either checking already available information or in the collection of new intelligence, such as chance statements against the regime or evasion of duty.

Communications between MAI Units.

50. Communications between MAI units must go through all channels of command.
51. All documents in use in the MAI units are classified under one of the headings, CONFIDENTIAL, STRICT CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, FOARTE SECRET, or SECRET DEOSEBIT.
52. Mail is put in white unmarked envelopes which are sealed with

- 33 -

wax. The wax seal is stamped with the classification and distribution notations of the envelope's contents. The envelope is always addressed to the receiving unit, and subsequently all the mail is packed into a leather bag, which is closed with a metal bar and locked (the bag is not sealed with wax). One key to the bag is kept by the unit at the receiving end. Each bag also contains a cover letter, on which its contents are listed with the serial number of each item. 50X1-HUM

53. The bags are carried between the units by special railroad couriers of the MAI units. In every passenger train the compartment nearest the engine is reserved for MAI couriers, regardless of whether any are on board. The couriers, who are always armed, may be either officers or enlisted men.
54. At lower levels, up to and including battalion, the mail is carried in ordinary envelopes by dispatch riders.
55. Radio communications are generally non-existent between MAI units and their national headquarters. The units use the civilian telephone and telegraph services by special lines allocated for military purposes. However, not all MAI telephone lines are connected to military exchanges. The Securitate uses its own special telephone lines. In the lower echelons, no code is used in telephone conversations, which therefore, are never of an

- 34 -

operational nature. However, at battalion level and above, telephone conversations are always coded.

56. The functions of MAI guard units are routine and extremely monotonous. In order to avoid the negligence bred by monotony and routine, the unit commanders must preserve maximum alertness and awareness among their subordinates. The tension created among the unit personnel to maintain them in a high state of alert has often resulted in unintentional false alarms. Following are examples of two false alarms and a real incident which occurred in late 1954:
- a. One night in about 1955, a panicky telephone message was received at the headquarters of the Timisoara MAI Guard Regiment. The caller, who belonged to the Valea Sadului guard company ^(see page 11 b, above) stated that the company was being attacked by heavy rifle fire, coming from the surrounding mountains. The headquarters in Timisoara ordered the company to hold on until reinforcements were sent, but at dawn the company reported to the headquarters that firing had ceased and the attackers had retreated. As there had been a thunderstorm, the headquarters had not hurried to send reinforcements, relying on the defensive fire of the Valea Sadului company. The following day the affair was investigated, and it was discovered that at

- 35 -

the beginning of the storm one of the guards had panicked and had fired at a shadow. His fellow guards, who heard his fire as well as the thunder, also began shooting. The ^{munitions} ~~Guarded by the Company~~ plant lay in a valley surrounded by mountains, which were constantly illuminated by flashes of lightening. Assuming that the shooting was coming from the mountains, the guards began to return fire with gusto. Although before they realizing^{ed} their mistake, about 16,000 rifle machine gun and submachine gun rounds had been fired, no one was punished because disciplinary action might have deterred other "alerts" in the future.

- b. In 1954 the Timisoara Regiment Headquarters was alerted by a unit which was guarding a bridge in the vicinity of Caransebes. Reinforcements from other units were rushed to the scene of the "incident", but a cease-fire was called before a thousand rounds had been fired. A Committee appointed to investigate the affair determined that a sentry had been playing with his rifle, carrying it on his shoulder with the barrel pointed to the ground. By accident he had fired a bullet very close to his feet, and he later claimed that a bullet had been fired at him (a ballistic test showed that it had been fired from his own rifle). To

- 36 -

justify the shot, the sentry began to shout "stop-password" and opened fire on a bush. His fellow guards immediately joined in the "battle," and it was only by chance that none of the local inhabitants strolling in the surrounding forests was wounded. Although there was sufficient reason to do so, no charge was brought against the sentry responsible for this incident.

- c. In late 1954 the guard unit on Muntele Mic informed Timisoara Regiment Headquarters that it was being attacked by heavy small arms fire near its perimeter fence and store buildings. Reinforcements were rushed to the scene from a nearby MAI shock troops unit, and the approximately 20 attackers retreated without losses, after an extensive exchange of fire. It was discovered that a gang of so-called "Partisans" (consisting of wanted criminals, adventurers, and dissatisfied insurgents, led by a Securitate lieutenant who had fled to the mountains and joined them) had attacked the Muntele Mic position to capture the unit's rations and ammunition supplies. During an extensive manhunt, which continued for several months, the members of the gang were wiped out one by one, and the operation was concluded in a battle



- 37 -

at a village where the last of its members had dug in.

About three or four of them were wounded, captured, and subsequently brought to trial, while the remainder, including their leader, were killed. This was the only incident during that period which had justified the use of live ammunition.

57. Attached is an overlay to a map (1:50,000), with legend, of Bucharest.

Legend to Overlay to Town Plan (1:50,000) of Bucharest

1. Securitate language^s and espionage school in Baneasa Forest.
2. Ministry of Interior radio station with two tall aerials.
3. Ministry of Interior Farm.
4. MAI 1st Regiment Headquarters, Bucharest.
5. General equipment stores (excluding rations, arms, and ammunition) of MAI units, near Straulesti village.
6. Guard Battalion Headquarters of the 1st Regiment, Bucharest
7. General MAI Headquarters barracks on Fagaras Street.
8. General MAI Headquarters barracks on Gen. Anghelescu Street.
9. MAI field security unit, formerly a guard company.
10. MAI radio center (single-story building with a low antenna farm in courtyard).
11. MAI guard company headquarters, near a Securitate "espionage school."

